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This paper aims to test whether vertical integrated farms show a significant higher economic 
performance when compared with those not integrated. The Italian Farm Accountancy Data 
Network was used, for the years 2008-2011, focusing on farms producing durum wheat. 
Empirically, a propensity score-matching model was implemented in an attempt to estimate 
average differences, in some farm performance indexes, including costs and profitability, 
between vertical integrated and non-integrated farms. The analysis on the effects of a 









Vertical integration in agribusiness is widely considered as a promising opportunity for value 
creation in rural economies and agri-food industry (Barney and Hesterly, 2011). While it 
could support farmers in their effort to leave the perimeter of commodities through retaining 
bigger share of the value chain (Caracciolo & Lombardi, 2012), supply chain integration is 
deemed as a necessary strategy to optimize the production system, helping agri-food 
industry to face the global competition (Bertazzoli et al., 2009). The theme of integration in 
agribusiness is relevant either in academic, business and policymaking communities (Seuring 
and Muller, 2008; Martino et al., 2012). 
One common feature of supply chain integration, gathered by the several definition available 
in the literature, can be summarized as follow: integration is the process of progressive 
dependence among different actors that brings to common investments, coordination of 
activities, and processes of learning and innovation (Handfield and Nichols, 1999; Hugos, 
2003). Integration may appear in different forms, changing on a case by case base, showing 
different intensity of coordination of cooperation and trust (Baldi, 2013). It can be based on 
agreements (formal or informal), including cultivation contracts, that may also lead to the 
development of unusual organizational frameworks such as industrial clusters, alliances, 
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and/or joint ventures (Menard, 2012). What emerges, though, is the need for (complex) 
forms of chain organization driven by organizational and contractual innovation (Freeman, 
2010). This is particularly true when a potential rise of conflicting values among actors take 
place when agreeing to participate, through integration, in a model of common business 
involving economic performance of a wide range of stakeholders (Rittel and Webber, 1973; 
Conklin, 2006). Though a positive effect of the integration is expected in the supply chain, to 
the best of our knowledge, it is still unclear the magnitude (if any) of the bargain at farm 
level. To that extent, the research question we try to address concerns the farms’ economic 
benefits of being involved in processor driven integration. 
Among the different forms of vertical integration, in Italy, a particular form of vertical 
integration in the pasta supply chain is coming out. It is characterized by an overall 
framework agreement signed by the main stakeholders involved in the supply chain 
(farmers, seeds and chemicals producers, dealers and food industry) sustained and 
supported by policy measures (within the programs for rural development). Within this 
framework agreement, the formal relations with durum wheat producers and pasta industry 
are regulated by contract farming designed in order to set not only the pricing mechanism 
(combining price to quality standards), but also the definition of a minimum volume of 
product to be delivered by farmers, and provisions and obligations for transferring 
production technologies and inputs (seeds, fertilizers and chemicals).  The advantages are 
diverse: While farmers may reduce price risk volatility by subscribing a minimum price 
guaranteed contract, industry can count on a stable supply in terms of quantity and quality. 
Moreover, farms may reduce transaction costs related to the search for buyers and may 
benefit of technical assistance, the latter representing a certainty advantage for farms with 
limited economic size usually unable to access to private agricultural extension services. On 
the other hand, farming practices obligations and stringent quality requirements, that affect 
overall price generation, may represent a serious risk for farmers of being legally trapped 
into a detrimental agreement due to the monopsonistic power of the industry. The latter 
aspects may partly explain the resistance to adhesion by farmers (Cembalo et al., 2014a). 
Pasta supply chain represents therefore an interesting case study for assessing whether 
vertical integration is really a bargain for the involved farmers. Consistent with this premise, 
our study covers farms specialized in durum wheat production by examining a large 
representative sample of farms present in the Italian FADN (Farm Accountancy Data 
Network).  
In order to assess whether vertical integrated farms experience higher economic 
performances than those non integrated, a propensity score matching (PSM) model was 
implemented in an attempt to estimate average in some revenue/costs/profitability indexes 
of Italian farms specialised in the production of durum wheat between integrated and non-
integrated farms.  
Since farms’ integration is not randomly assigned, the choice of participating to a contract 
scheme may depend on a number of farms characteristics that are, in turn, related to the 
measures of profitability. Propensity score matching allows to take into account these 
observable variables, matching integrated farm with a subsample of non integrated ones 
that show similar probability to be vertical integrated (also known as propensity score). 
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Results provide evidence to the belief that farms benefit from vertical integration in terms of 
gross sales and farms profitability (in terms of relative profit differences). Moreover, 
integration does not affect the burden of variable and fixed costs: vertical integration seems 





The modelling approach implemented sought to estimate average differences, in farms 
competitiveness and profitability, between vertical integrated and non-integrated farms. The 
first methodological step involves the design of the farms' profitability measure throughout 
the information provided by the FADN. Indexes have to, by their nature, be based on a case-
by-case base since they need to by functionally consistent with the aim of the analysis in 
hand. For each of the 2,450 farms reported in the Italian FADN, in the years from 2008 to 
2011, Gross sales, Net Income, Variable Costs and Fixed costs per UAA hectares were 
computed. Starting from those basic indexes, a farm competitiveness and profitability 
measure was computed, namely the Relative profit differences (RPD). RPD is a measure of 
competition characterized by a robust theoretical foundation first proposed by Boone (2008). 
RPD is a normalized measure of farm profitability adjusted by farms efficiency. To illustrate, 
assuming that farms are ordered such that the economic efficiency of farms is decreasing in i 
(with i being the i-th farm in the sample), RPD can be calculated as: 
 
 ܴܲܦ௜ ൌ గ೔ିగಿగభషగಿ     (1) 
 
Where π1 is the profit corresponding to the farm with the highest efficiency, while πN 
corresponds to the profit of the least efficient farm. Boone proposed the average variable 
costs as a measure of efficiency. In our analysis Variable Costsi/Gross salesi ratio was used 
instead, where Gross Sales were computed by summing up the whole sale coming from all 
agricultural products sold by the i-th farm. Together with the RPD, an index at farm level, a 
set of measures specifically computed on durum wheat production, where taken into 
consideration. They are: durum wheat Gross sale, Gross margin (gross sales minus direct 
production costs), yield per hectare, and Variable costs. 
The second methodological step relates to the PSM. In order to illustrate this statistical 
procedure, it is worth spending some words on the overall approach. Data were treated in 
the framework of quasi-experimental studies. The latter term comes from behavioural 
economics and non-statistically oriented literature (Shadish et al. 2002). More explicitly, one 
of the main features of quasi-experimental studies concerns the so-called treatment effects. 
An observational study shares, with a purely experimental one, the same purpose but, unlike 
an experiment, no method of experimental design is implemented to maintain a control 
group (Guo and Fraser 2010). In this context, treated and control groups (also termed 
counterfactual) may show large differences in terms of covariates, such as farm size or 
farmer education for example, yielding biased estimates of treatment effects. This kind of 
study is necessary when randomised assignment of treated and non-treated groups are 
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infeasible, unethical, or when researchers need to assess differences between groups under 
particular marketing strategy settings. The latter motivation is one of the main critiques of 
social experiments made by econometricians. Heckman and Smith (1995), for instance, 
argue that randomisation is unfeasible, or non-desirable, when institutions and social 
environments are part of the decisional process and are therefore relevant when the purpose 
of the study is to design policy intervention following a behavioural economics analysis 
(Heckman 1979; Heckman and Smith 1995). In quasi-experimental studies, where the task is 
to evaluate treatment effects in a non-randomization approach, in order to reduce the 
multidimensional information (namely farm/farmers variables) to only one score, it is worth 
invoking the so called propensity score. Since the seminal work of Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) on propensity score analysis, this method has become increasingly popular in quasi-
experimental studies. The propensity score approach has been implemented in many 
disciplines such as psychology (Jones et al. 2004), medicine (Earle et al. 2001; Gum et al. 
2001), education, social work (Barth et al. 2007; Weigensberg et al. 2009), and social 
welfare studies (LaLonde 1986; Michalopoulos et al. 2004). When participation in a supply 
chain is not randomly assigned but stochastically depends on a number of observable 
variables, the propensity score can be implemented as a measure of conditional probability 
of participation conditional upon the observed variables (farm and farmer characteristics). 
Let x be the observable variables, and p(x) the conditional probability of treatment 
participation (or propensity score): 
 ሺሻ ൌ ሾ ൌ ͳȁ ൌ ሿ     (2) 
 
Given Di and xi, the propensity score can be calculated by implementing, for example, a logit 
regression (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). Once a propensity score estimation is computed, the 
next step is to match the treated (vertical integrated farms) to a control (non-integrated 
farms) group based on the estimated propensity score. The intuition behind matching is to 
generate a new data sample built by only those cases that share a similar likelihood of being 
vertical integrated. This likelihood is the propensity score. The most common matching 
algorithm is the greedy matching. There are many methods to achieve greedy matching 
(D’Agostino 1998; Smith and Todd 2005; Guo and Fraser 2010). The method implemented in 
this paper follows that implemented in Dehejia and Wahba (1999; 2002). The core idea 
starts from a widely used measure of treatment effects that can be calculated as treatment 
evaluation: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET). In the specific case of our 
study we consider a group of farms that sell all or part of their products directly to the 
industry (vertical integration). ATET measures the differences, or average gain, from those 
farms and non-integrated farms (Heckman and Vytlacil 2007).  
In our study, following Dehejia and Wahba (1999; 2002), we estimated a logit model on the 
probability of being vertical integrated: 
 ሾ୧ ൌ ͳȁ୧ሿ ൌ Ȧሺ୧ᇱȾሻǡ ൌ ͳǡǥ ǡ ʹͶͷͲ   (3) 
 
where Ȧሺ ൌ ୧ᇱȾሻ ൌ ୸ ሺͳ ൅ ୸ሻΤ , while the regressors are some farm and farmers 
characteristics (reported in table 1). Any matching method involves tradeoffs between the 
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number of matches and the quality of matching, and none is clearly superior to the others. 
Hence, from a general specification of the ATET, we chose to estimate stratification method 
following Dehejia and Wahba (1999; 2002). In order to verify which variables showed a 
significant difference between the two groups, a t-test was performed.  
As stated above, propensity score matching is a sound tool to net out the effect of the 
treatment. It is worth specifying the concept of treatment for vertical integrated farms. 
Treatment is a general term used in the literature of observational or quasi-experimental 
studies. In our case, participating in an integrated supply chain involves a set of decision 
making processes able to add value  to a supply chain through new relations among 
stakeholders. Of particular interest is the ability of these stakeholders to develop a sense of 
cooperation, through ties of reciprocity, and construct relational structures able to generate 
value and efficiency in the supply chain. Although one cannot talk of a treatment as such, 
participation in a vertical integration framework, for the reasons stated above, has a non-
neutral effect on the same participants, as if participation was an actual treatment exercised 
by the agents (individuals) participating at the integrated supply chain. 
 
 
Data and Results 
 
Data used in the analysis comes from the Italian Farm accounting data network (FADN) 
database1. Records from farmers belonging to 3 distinct types of farming (TF) specialized in 
arable crops were collected from the year 2008 to the year 2011 (Table 1). 
Within this subset, only farms producing durum wheat were considered in the analysis. A 
total of 2,450 farms were included in the sample. Vertical integration was observed in 183 
farms representing about 7.5% of the sample. 
Table 1 reports the farms structural and economic characteristics and farmers socio-
demographic profile involved in the analysis. Age, education level, gender and entrepreneur 
status where measured for the farmers. At farm level, utilized agricultural area, presence of 
livestock, land and other capital  assets, presence of irrigation, subsidies beneficiary and 
working intensity (hours) were also measured. Of all the agricultural producers included in 
the sample, 21 percent are female (15% in integrated farms), the average age is 59 years 
(in the range 22–98 years). As regards education, the 9 percent of the agricultural producers 
are educated to a higher level (12% in integrated farms). About half of the farms (49.8%) 
are located in the South of Italy (including Sicily and Sardinia), while this percentage is 
slightly lower for integrated farms (47.5%) With regard to structural characteristics, average 
utilized agricultural area is approximately 61 hectares (92 hectares for integrated farms), 
while average annual gross sale is valued at € 1,107 per hectare (€ 1,107 per hectare for 
integrated farms). Finally, about the 3 percent of the sampled farms have been awarded a 
quality certification (the 6 percent for integrated farms). Only explanatory variables 
statistically significant were left in the Logit model where the dependent variable assumes 
value 1 if the farm resulted vertically integrated and 0 otherwise (Table 2). 
 
                                                          
1 Data are available from http://bancadatirica.inea.it/  
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Mean std.dev   Mean std.dev 
Farmer age (years) 58.86 12.81   59.89 13.35 
Farmer education (degree) 4.09 1.58   3.69 1.51 
Farmer gender (1 = female, 0 male) 0.15  N.A   0.22 N.A 
      Quality certification (1 = presence, 0 otherwise) 0.06 N.A  0.02 N.A 
Organic certification (1 = presence, 0 otherwise) 0.04 N.A   0.03 N.A 
Investment in the last 5 years (1= yes, 0 
otherwise) 0.39 N.A   0.33 N.A 
Land property (€/ha) 83.91 128.35   59.48 119.85 
Farm UAA hectares 91.73 97.02   57.25 74.99 
Intensity of Mechanization (kw/ha) 4.92 5.07   6.05 5.67 
Irrigation (1 = presence, 0 otherwise) 0.09 N.A   0.07 N.A 
 
          
Gross Sales (per hectare) 1,234.11 703.48   1,097.77 744.88 
Relative profit differences 2.53 3.19   1.28 2.29 
Fixed costs (per hectare) 232.39 209.30   245.67 266.18 
Variable costs (per hectare) 697.00 468.57   642.06 521.48 
            
Wheat - yield (q.ls/ha) 38.34 13.86   37.79 12.16 
Wheat - Gross Sales (per hectare) 1,021.81 576.62   913.44 367.19 
Wheat - Gross margin  (per hectare) 669.06 556.21   558.17 354.99 
Wheat - Variable costs (per hectare)  352.75 168.88   355.28 174.21 
 
Table 2 - Vertical integration participation model (logit with regional fixed effect) 
Variables Prob[Y=1];  
1: Integrated farm 
  
UAA: hectares 0.003*** 
 (0.00) 
Certification: 1 if product and/or process certified 0.922*** 
 (0.36) 
Gender: 1 if female farmer -0.522** 
 (0.22) 
Conduction: 1 if farm conducted with salaried -0.366* 
 (0.19) 
Age: years -0.001 
 (0.01) 






Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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From the propensity score estimation, we obtain groups with different numbers of treatment 
and control units, making sure that each groups benefit of the balancing property:  both the 
average propensity score and the average for each explanatory variable between treated 
and controls have to be equal. As a result, only a portion of the original sample was taken 
into account. The area of common support (similar propensity scores) between integrated 
and non-integrated groups resulted to be 96%, corresponding to 2,327 farms over the 2,450 
included in FADN, and the balancing property was satisfied at significance level of p < 0.01. 
Results reported in the table 2 suggest that probability to be integrated depends on the 
farm’s size and by the level of education, while farms owned by female entrepreneurs are 
less likely to be vertical integrated. Finally, it is worth noting that the presence of certification 
positively influences the probability of a farm to be vertical integrated.  
Table 3 and 4 report the estimates for the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) 
based on the propensity score matching method. Results support the hypothesis that vertical 
integration has a positive impact on the farms profitability.  
 
Table 3 - ATET on farm profitability measures (method: stratification) 
Outcomes RPD Gross Sales^ Fixed Costs^ Variable Costs^ 
ATET 0.60** 167.77*** 6.52 68.42 
 
(0.27) (63.53) (17.79) (48.81) 
    
Observations 2,327 (Treatment # 183; Control #2,144) 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
^ per hectare 
 
Table 4. ATET on durum wheat profitability measures (method: stratification) 
Outcomes Gross Sales^ Variable Costs^ Yield^ Gross Margin 
ATET 130.72*** 1.42 4.64 126.08*** 
 
(43.43) (0.98) (16.03) (43.67) 
    
Observations 2,327 (Treatment # 183; Control #2,144) 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
^ per hectare. 
 
To illustrate, results show a positive effect of the vertical integration on the overall Gross 
Sales (+168€ per hectare) and on the specific durum wheat measures: Gross Sales and 
Gross Margin are respectively +131€ and + 126€ per hectare. As concerns the relative profit 
differences, the difference in ATET between integrated and non-integrated groups are 
positive (about +0.60, representing an increase of around 40% compared with the mean 
RPD value of non integrated farms) and statistically significant. As for the variables related to 
the costs (fixed and variable) and durum wheat yield, they do not seem to be affected by 
vertical integration. These results, confined at the durum wheat sector, suggest that 
integrated farms, showing the same yields and costs, may benefit of higher market prices 
when compared with non-integrated ones. Several interpretations can be given on why 
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integrated farms may benefit higher market prices. Vertical integration implies a shorter 
value chain and this condition may foster agricultural producers to achieve a greater share of 
the total returns.  Moreover, vertical integration in the pasta supply chain is mainly driven by 
the industry through contract schemes: these contracts are designed in order to maximize 
quality standards recognized by the market, including sometimes farmers obligations to 
particular requirements (e.g. use of certified seed varieties, adoption of rotations and specific 
agronomic practices), providing economic incentives for the farmers. In particular, the 
increased awareness of the  food consumers towards the quality characteristics of raw 
material is fostering also Italian pasta producers to assure durum wheat that may seize the 
consumers' demand of local and traditional food. Thus, vertical integration may be seen, 
within a certain degree, as an important component of de-commoditization strategy for 





In this paper we have presented an empirical study aiming at measuring the effect of vertical 
integration on farms economic performance. Given the time span and type of farming 
considered, results indicate that vertical integration provides higher economic benefits to 
farmers.  
Estimates provide evidence to the belief that farmer may benefit from vertical integration in 
terms of gross sales and overall farms profitability (in terms of relative profit differences). 
Moreover, integration does not affect the burden of variable and fixed costs: vertical 
integration seems not to significantly change farms’ production organization. Thus, results 
may suggest that farms establishing integration relations with the processing industry are 
more committed to exert effort to pursue quality improvement of their products and, 
consequently, to benefit higher prices on their market. This goal seems being reachable 
without a deterioration of the costs structure and / or a reduction in yields. 
Our empirical results, however, should be treated with caution. Further investigation should 
enlarge the time span considered and farming typology. From a methodological point of 
view, some problems could derive from the ATET computations using PSM model, because 
PSM solves the selection bias associated to observable variables, while it cannot take into 
account unobservable characteristics of the farm/farmer that could also affect selection as 
well. Further studies could be performed to refine the PSM procedure, controlling for the 
unobservable source of selection bias. Another question to be addressed, left to further 
researches, concerns the individual propensity to integrate.  In other terms, if the farm-level 
benefits of integration are so attractive, why are many farmers still unwilling to participate in 
this type of vertical integration? This work is not able to answer to this question. While our 
study confirms a comparative advantage to be vertically integrated in a supply chain, it does 
not explain why those farms with the same likelihood to be integrated do not act in that 
direction. A number of studies are merging economic and sociological paradigms to cover 
this lack of knowledge. Recent studies that investigates wheat producers willingness to join 
contract farming in Italy (Cembalo et al., 2014b) reported that, especially in some production 
environments, the presence of information asymmetries could be the main constraint to the 
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establishment of contract farming based integration. Moreover, in some context, the small 
farming dimension may discourage processing industry to establish contractual framework 
that are not able to supply enough quantities of wheat for the industry purpose.  We believe 
that this field is still underexplored.  
Policy implication could be depicted from our results. A number of policy measures were 
already introduced to facilitate the development of such forms of contracts, providing co-
financing support as well other forms of incentives to the actors involved to the partnership. 
However, specific policy interventions are needed to increase farmers' willingness to join 
contract farming, through information activities, training and dissemination of the expected 
positive benefits. Furthermore, in the light of a greater importance that supply integration 
will have in the future, policy makers should be aware that a sizable part of the value 
creation through integration remains at farm level. This is not a trivial result if one things 
that distribution of benefits along a supply chain is often an issue, being farmers very often 
the weak side of valuable chains. However, future investigations on this topic are needed 
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